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I. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. NATUREOFTHECASE 
This appeal presents the issue over the award of attorney fees and costs awarded to the 
Defendant(s)-Respondent(s) upon the dismissal of the Complaint filed by the Plaintiff-Appellant, 
awarded to them upon the basis they were either the prevailing parties under Rule 54, I.R.C.P. 
and/or entitled to fees and costs under §12-121, Idaho Code, as it was suggested in the proposed 
judgment,, though stricken :from the "Judgment" by the Court when entered on August 28, 2014, 
(Cl. R. pp. 199-201 ), which "Judgment" followed months after the Court's entry of the "Judgment 
Dismissing Case" (Cl. R. pp.163-64) on April 4, 2014. The Judgment Dismissing Case pronounced 
IT IS SO ORDERED the above case is dismissed without prejudice, subject to the Court's retaining 
jurisdiction to rule on any timely filed request for costs and attorney fees. (Cl. R. pp. 163-164). 
The action filed by Plaintiff-Appellant was dismissed by the District Court upon the belief 
that Plaintiff, Victoria H, Smith, could no longer be the "real party in interest" in the action, as she 
had become deceased previous to filing the action, and the power of attorney utilized by her son, 
Vernon K. Smith, to file the action (being the sole heir of Victoria H. Smith), had filed the action in 
her behalf, through the use of his durable and irrevocable power of attorney, which had terminated 
and became void under the Uniform Power of Attorney Act, §15-12-110, Idaho Code, upon the 
demise of the Plaintiff, and as a consequence of that termination, there was no "real party in 
interest" currently named to pursue the controversy, as such a "real Party" must exist under Rule 
17(a) I.R.C.P .. 
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The District Court then entered its "Judgment" (Cl. R. pp.199-201) on August 28, 2014, 
awarding attorney fees and costs of $15,826.50, together with post judgment interest as of the date 
of the judgment at 5.125% interest, as fixed by §28-22-104(2), Idaho Code. 
B. COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS BELOW 
This action was commenced on December 13, 2013 (Cl. R. p. 5-19), two days before the statute 
of limitations would take effect. It was filed naming Victoria H. Smith as Plaintiff, by and through 
her attorney in fact, Vernon K. Smith, through his durable and irrevocable power of attorney, as the 
agreement Vernon K. Smith (hereafter referred to, at times, as "Smith") had entered into with the 
Defendants was done with that power of attorney in 2008, and it was thought appropriate that 
authority and capacity should be carried forward into that pleading, subject to any needed 
amendment or substitution if required, all of which was done for the sake of continuity of the 
relationships. A Notice of Appearance was filed by Defendants'-Respondents' counsel on January 
27, 2014 (Cl. R. pp. 34-35), and the Answer, with Counterclaims and Demand for Jury Trial, was 
filed on behalf of Defendant, Treasure Valley Seed Company, LLC, on January 28, 2014 (Cl. R. pp. 
36-108), and the Answer and Demand for Jury Trial was also filed on behalf of Don Tolmie on 
January 28, 2014 as well (Cl. R. pp. 109-114). No defense was ever asserted by these Defendants 
regarding whether the Plaintiff, Victoria H. Smith, was or was not the "real party in interest", or 
whether the use of the power of attorney to file the action in the first place was outside the scope of 
any valid agency or representative capacity to initiate suit under the name of the Decedent. Victoria 
H. Smith had died on September 11, 2013, three months before the case was filed, but the original 
transaction with Treasure Valley Seed had been negotiated and entered into by Smith, which was 
also in behalf of Victoria H. Smith, that began with the crop season to grow the lima beans in 2007, 
and thereafter it was Mr. Smith who negotiated the settlement and sale of the lima beans that had 
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been produced, which included the use of the same power of attorney, with Don Tolmie, who was 
acting on behalf of Treasure Valley Seed, which sale's agreement was concluded on December 15, 
2008. All of the relevant activity that had transpired in the creation of the agreement, and all 
relevant factors that gave rise to the cause of action, were commenced and completed during the life 
of Victoria H. Smith, during the enforceability of the power of attorney, and it included that 
capacity the action was pursued, as that was the way in which the facts had begun. 
The Defendants filed, along with their responsive pleadings, their Motion for Change of 
Venue, from Ada County to Canyon County, (Cl. R. pp.115-127), and on February 12, 2014, a 
Notice of Hearing was filed with the Court, setting the hearing on that motion for March 24, 2014 
(Cl. R. pp.137-138), but no hearing was thereafter held, as the District Court issued its scheduling 
Order on February 10, 2014 (Cl. R. pp. 130-136), setting the conference to occur on March 3, 2014 
at 4:45 p.m., during which Conference (held March 3, 2014), the Court raised the issue addressing 
the demise of Victoria H. Smith, confirming with Plaintiff's counsel that she had, in fact, died on 
September 11, 2013, as the Court was aware of that fact, and the Court then proposed the matter be 
addressed upon a motion to dismiss, which the Defendants then filed their Motion to Dismiss on 
March 18, 2014 (Cl. R. pp.143-149), and lodged their Memorandum supporting their Motion on 
March 18, 2014 (Cl. R. pp. 150-153). The Memorandum lodged with the Court (as identified in the 
Clerk's Record) was received and filed incomplete, but represents what the Court received to 
support Defendants' position in the matter. 
In response to Defendants' Motion to Dismiss, Plaintiff's counsel filed the Response and 
Objection To Defendants Motion to Dismiss And filed a Motion To Substitute Parties with Vernon 
K. Smith, As the Real Party In Interest on April 1, 2014 (Cl. R. pp.154-159), and filed a Motion For 
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Joinder Of a Real Party In Interest And Permissive Joinder Of Parties, Pursuant to Rules 17(a) and 
20(a) JR.C.P. on April 1, 2014 (CL R. pp.160-162). 
On April 4, 2014, the District Court dismissed the case, entering the Order entitled: 
Judgment Dismissing Case, stating "the above case is dismissed without prejudice subject to the 
Court's retaining jurisdiction to rule on any timely filed request for costs and attorney fees. IT IS SO 
ORDERED" (Cl. R. pp. 163-164). 
On April 17, 2014, Defendants then filed Defendant's Memorandum of Costs (Cl. R. pp. 
165-169), and on that same date filed the Affidavit of Richard B. Eismann, filed in support Of the 
Memorandum of Costs (Cl. R. pp. 170-188). On April 30, 2014, Plaintiffs counsel filed the 
Response and Objection To Defendants' Request For Attorney Fees (Cl. R. pp. 189-191). Hearing 
upon the Objection to Defendants' motion for attorney fees and costs was initially scheduled for 
July 9, 2014, as identified in the Notice of Hearing filed June 23, 2014 (Cl. R. pp. 192-193), but 
pursuant to motion to vacate due to scheduling conflicts with a lengthy trial, filed June 30, 2014, 
(Cl. R. pp. 194-195), the hearing was re-scheduled and held on July 28, 2014, as reflected in the 
Amended Notice of Hearing filed July 3. 2014 (Cl. R. pp. 197-198). Following that hearing, the 
District Court filed the "Judgment" on August 28, 2014 (Cl. R. pp. 199-201), therein awarding 
Defendants costs and attorney fees against Vernon K. Smith and the Plaintiff, jointly and severly 
[sic], in the sum of$15,826.50, together with interest thereafter at 5.125%. 
An appeal was thereafter taken of the 'judgment" of August 28, 2014 (Cl. R. pp. 202-205) 
to the Idaho Supreme Court on October 8, 2014, as the April 4, 2014 "Judgment Dismissing Case 
was viewed to be an interlocutory order as its language so suggested, and thereafter a cross-appeal 
was filed with the Court on October 23, 2014, wherein Defendants-Cross-Appellants were seeking 
further attorney fees in the appeal (Cl. R. pp. 206-208). 
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C. STATEMENT OF FACTS 
This case was filed to obtain payment due under the lima bean sale's transaction entered into 
with Treasure Seed Company, LLC, under the purchase arrangements made with Smith and Don 
Tolmie, the agent and representative of Treasure Valley Seed. The sale occurred on December 15, 
2008. The case was filed by Smith, pursuant to his durable and irrevocable power of attorney, 
through his legal representation as counsel for his mother, Victoria H. Smith, sought recovery upon 
the written purchase contract of December 15, 2008, or in the alternative recovery upon an implied 
contract in fact or implied in law. The power of attorney was thought appropriate to represent the 
existence of the Agreement and authority to file suit, as the transaction was entered into with that 
authority in 2008, and Smith, who was the sole heir of her estate, could be substituted in thereafter, 
if necessary, or initiate the formation of an estate, should probate become necessary, as Victoria H. 
Smith had died three months earlier on September 11, 2013. 
Victoria H. Smith had been historically engaged in farming operations in Ada County, 
Idaho, through her son, Vernon K. Smith, raising agricultural crops and commodities, which came 
to include baby lima beans, all of which was being pursued through the efforts and activities of her 
son, who at times also acted as her attorney in fact, and it was he who had arranged to raise lima 
beans with Treasure Valley Seed Company, LLC for the growing season of 2007. 
Vernon K. Smith, as her son and attorney in fact, was acting as Plaintiffs attorney in fact 
pursuant to his durable and irrevocable power of attorney issued to him in 1999, and transacted the 
arrangements with Treasure Valley Seed Company, LLC, in 2007, along with his activities in the 
farming operations, that included the marketing, merchandising and selling of the agricultural 
commodities, including these baby lima beans he had grown in the year 2007, and were then to be 
purchased by and paid for by Treasure Valley Seed Company, LLC. 
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Treasure Valley Seed Company, LLC, (hereafter Treasure Valley) is a seed business 
company located in Homedale Idaho. Don Tolmie was their authorized representative, agent, and 
represented to be a participating owner of Treasure Valley, and he agreed to act as the authorized 
field representative for the Company on the Smith farm, and Mr. Tolmie made various inducements, 
promises and representations, and later made the sale's arrangements with Smith. 
On December 15, 2008, Don Tolmie contracted to purchase all of the 2007 crop of baby 
lima beans, which consisted of a net weight of 124,552 lbs. (1,245.52 one hundred weight ( cwt)), at 
a net purchase price of $0.55 per pound ($55.00 per hundred weight ( cwt)), for a total net purchase 
price of $68,503.60. 
It was specifically agreed no storage would be charged for any period of time the beans 
were being stored by Treasure Valley, (stated in the written purchase agreement) and no further 
costs or expenses would be incurred or deducted from that net purchase price, as the agreement was 
a net purchase and sale price of $68,503.60 for the lima beans. 
The Purchase and Sale Agreement, identified as Order Number 4054, referring to Plaintiff 
as Customer Number 37470, was created and is attached to the Complaint filed by Smith, along 
with a copy of the envelope in which the Agreement was delivered to Smith at the farm. The 
calculated clean weight of the baby lima beans, generated by Treasure Valley after their cleaning 
process was completed, was attached to the pleadings. 
Treasure Valley took physical possession of the lima beans at the conclusion of the harvest 
of the beans in 2007, and thereafter exercised the exclusive dominion and control over the beans, 
but failed to pay the purchase price agreed to, and refused to surrender the beans back to Smith, or 
make any other acceptable payment to Smith for the agreed purchase price. 
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Following the sale's transaction of December 15, 2008, Smith wrote to Don Tolmie at 
Treasure Valley, on December 26, 2008, confirming certain conversations, and verifying the 
agreement they had reached on December 15, 2008, and expressed concerns about the performance 
that was to follow the sale of the lima beans, as Mr. Tolmie had not delivered confirmation of his 
represented "sale" of the beans to the third-party, the basis upon which he had used to agree to 
$55.00 cwt insteasd of the $75.00 cwt value that Smith believed was more like the true market value 
at the time, and Smith was concerned Tolmie was deceiving him about the true value, as he had 
failed to produce the "sale contract to the third party, as he had promised he would do, and instead it 
was beginning to appear that Treasure Valley was still holding the beans in their warehouse in 
Homedale, Idaho, having deceived Smith about his sale arrangements. A copy of Smith's letter was 
attached to the Complaint. 
Don Tolmie and Treasure Valley failed and refused to disclose any sales to the third party; 
failed to pay as agreed, yet continued to retain the possession of the beans, and continued their 
control over the entire quantity of beans, and the commodity "supposedly" remained in storage with 
Treasure Valley, having been taken there under the direction of Don Tolmie when taken from the 
farm in the fall of 2007, upon his representations and commitments to do that which he said he 
would do as identified in the letter of December 26, 2008, attached to the Complaint. 
Consequently, Treasure Valley failed to pay under the terms of the agreement, and remain 
indebted to Smith for the principal sum of $68,503.60, together with accrued interest after 
December 15, 2008, for which reason suit was finally filed by Smith on December 13, 2013, on 
behalf of Victoria H. Smith, who had died 3 months earlier on September 11, 2013. Because the 
Power of Attorney was the vehicle used in forming the transaction with Treasure Valley in 2007, 
and the subsequent sale's agreement in 2008, it was deemed to be appropriate to continue on with 
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that basis that had created the relationship between Smith and Don Tolmie, and that capacity could 
be utilized in the pleadings, even after the death of Victoria to reflect the formation of their 
relationship, as no estate had been opened for probate, and no legitimate excuse existed (from 
Plaintiffs perspective, to delay recovery and avoid further controversy, and a subsequent 
amendment or substitution could take place, if required, if the controversy continued, and with Mr. 
Eismann as counsel for Treasure Valley, that would prove to evolve into controversy, and a need to 
substitute may be required, as that proved to be the case. It was believed that if the obligation was 
challenged, and a controversy required litigation upon the merits, there could then be a substitution 
of the Party Plaintiff, if found necessary, either with Smith, individually, as he was the sole heir, or 
amend to include their entity VHS Properties, LLC, in which both were members, and had acquired 
Victoria's interests, and ifrequired or preferred by the Court, file a probate and open an estate, and 
substitute the estate, should that be declared the preferred method to establish a "real party in 
interest" as required, and as allowed, by the Rules of Civil Procedure, Rules 17 and 20, LR. C.P ... 
D. STANDARD OF REVIEW 
The issues raised in this appeal concerns the award of costs and attorney fees by the lower Court 
upon the dismissal of the action by the District Court for failure to have the real party in interest 
identified in the initial complaint. This matter appears to be addressed and reviewed as a 
combination of free review and abuse of discretion, upon appeal. When this Appellate Court 
reviews the decision of a district court that concerns the proper application of procedural rules, 
that allows free review. The Court has stated: We exercise free review over questions regarding 
the application of procedural rules. Zenner v. Holcomb, 147 Idaho 444, 450, 210 P.3d 552, 558 
(2009) (quoting Blaser v. Cameron, 116 Idaho 453, 455, 776 P.2d 462, 464 (Ct. App. 1989)). 
The issue and calculation of a reasonable attorney fee is a matter of the court's discretion. Grease 
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Spot, Inc. v. Harnes, 148 Idaho 582, 586, 226 P.3d 524, 528 (2010) (citing LR.C.P. 54(e)(3); 
Johannsen v. Utterbeck, 146 Idaho 423,432, 196 P.3d 341,350 (2008)). When deciding whether 
a trial court abused its discretion, the standard is "whether the court perceived the issue as one of 
discretion, acted within the outer boundaries of its discretion and consistently with the legal 
standards applicable to the specific choices available to it, and reached its decision by an exercise 
of reason." Read v. Harvey, 147 Idaho 364, 369, 209 P.3d 661, 666 (2009) (citing Sun Valley 
Shopping Ctr. v. Idaho Power Co., 119 Idaho 87, 94, 803 P.2d 993, 1000 (1991)). In Idaho 
Military Historical Society v. Maslen, 156 Idaho 624, 329 P.3d 1072 (2014), the Court stated: An 
award of attorney fees pursuant to LC.§ 12-121 and LR.C.P. 54(e)(l) will not be disturbed absent 
an abuse of discretion. See Savage v. Lateral Ditch Water Users Ass 'n v. Pulley, 125 Idaho 237, 
250, 869 P.2d 554, 567 (1993). The district court's determination as to whether an action was 
brought or defended frivolously will not be disturbed absent an abuse of discretion. Anderson v. 
Ethington, 103 Idaho 658, 660, 651 P.2d 923, 925 (1981). When an exercise of discretion is 
involved, this Court conducts a three-step inquiry: (1) whether the trial court properly perceived the 
issue as one of discretion; (2) whether that court acted within the outer boundaries of such discretion 
and consistently with any legal standards applicable to specific choices; and (3) whether the court 
reached its decision by the exercise ofreason. Sun Valley Shopping Center v. Idaho Power Co., 119 
Idaho 87, 94,803 P.2d 993, 1000 (1991). 156 Idaho at 629,329 P.3d at 1077. 
A court's determination to make an award of attorney fees to a prevailing party under LC. § 
12-121 is entirely discretionary. Webster v. Hoopes, 126 Idaho 96, 100, 878 P.2d 795, 799 
(Ct.App.1994). In Ross v. Ross, 142 Idaho 536, 129 P.3d 1285 (Ct.App.2006) the Court declared 
the following applicable standard for an award of attorney fees under LC. § 12-121, wherein the 
Court stated: 
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[W]hen deciding whether the case was brought or defended frivolously, unreasonably, or without 
foundation, the entire course of the litigation must be taken into account. Vendelin v. Costco 
Wholesale Corp., 140 Idaho 416, 434, 95 P.3d 34, 52 (2004); McGrew, 139 Idaho at 562, 82 
P .3d at 844. If there is a legitimate, triable issue of fact, attorney fees may not be awarded under 
I.C. § 12-121 even though the losing party has asserted factual or legal claims that are frivolous, 
unreasonable, or without foundation. Vendelin, 140 Idaho at 434, 95 P.3d at 52; Nampa & 
Meridian Irr. Dist., 135 Idaho at 524-25, 20 P.3d at 708-09. 142 Idaho at 539, 129 P.3d at 1288 
( emphasis added). In other words, if there is at least one legitimate issue presented in this case, 
attorney fees cannot be awarded under LC. § 12-121 even though the losing party may have 
asserted other factual or legal claims that arc allegedly frivolous, unreasonable, or without 
adequate legal or factual foundation. McGrew v. McGrew, 139 Idaho 551,562, 82 P.3d 833, 844 
(2003). 
In addition, when making an award of attorney fees under LC. § 12-121 the court is 
required by Rule 54(e)(2) to make written findings stating the basis and reasons for the award 
of attorney fees under that statute. Those findings made by the court in support of an award 
of attorney fees under J.C. § 12-121 must be supported by the record as supporting the court's 
determination that the entire action was pursued frivolously. See Wait v. Leavell Cattle, Inc., 
136 Idaho 792, 799, 41 P .. 3d 220,227 (2002). (Emphasis added). 
In Wing v. Amalgamated Sugar Co., 106 Idaho 905, 684 P.2d 307 (Ct.App.1984) the 
Court stated the standard (and thusly the standard of review) upon which an award of attorney 
fees under LC. § 12-121 was to be based: 
A misperception of law or of one's interest under the law is not, by itself. unreasonable 
conduct. If it were, virtually every case controlled by a question of law would entail an attorney 
fee award against the losing party under LC. § 12-121. Rather, the question must be whether the 
position adopted by the owner was not only incorrect but so plainly fallacious that it could be 
deemed frivolous, unreasonable or without foundation. 106 Idaho at 911, 684 P .2d at 313. See 
also, Herbst v. Bothof Dairies, Inc., 110 Idaho 971, 975, 719 P.2d 1231, 1235 (Ct.App.1986) 
("The standard for determining whether such an award should be made is not whether the 
position urged by the nonprevailing party is ultimately found to be wrong, but whether it is so 
plainly fallacious as to be frivolous."); and Gulf Chemical Employees Federal Credit Union v. 
Williams, 107 Idaho 890, 894, 693 P.2d 1092, 1096 (Ct.App.1984) ("[A] claim is not necessarily 
frivolous or Jacking in merit simply because it ultimately fails as a matter of law. Rather, the 
question is whether the claim when made and pursued, is so plainly fallacious that it can be 
termed frivolous, unreasonable or without foundation."). (Emphasis added). 
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In Walker v. Boozer, 140 Idaho 451, 95 P.3d 69 (2004) the Court stated: 
The district court cited I.R.C.P. 54(e)(l) and LC.§ 12-121 as the basis for awarding attorney fees 
incurred by the Quaker Haven Ovvners in defending against the Boozers' Motion to Alter or 
Amend the Judgment. Pursuant to I.R.C.P. 54(e)(l), attorney fees may be granted under LC. § 
12-121 only when a court finds from the facts presented to it, "that the case was brought, pursued 
or defended frivolously, unreasonably or without foundation." I.R.C.P. 54(e)(l) (emphasis 
added). The denial of a motion does not fall within the scope of the authority cited by the 
district court because a single motion does not comprise an entire case. In other words, LC. § 
12-121 applies to cases as a whole and not to individual motions. See Turner v. Willis, 119 
Idaho 1023, 1025, 812 P.2d 737, 739 (1991); Mgmt. Catalysts v. Turbo W Corpac, Inc., 119 
Idaho 626, 630, 809 P.2d 487, 491 (1991); Magic Valley Radiology Assoc. P.A. v. Prof'! Bus. 
Servs., Inc., 119 Idaho 558, 563, 808 P.2d 1303, 1308 (1991). Therefore, the award of attorney 
fees is reversed because the authority cited by the district court does not support such an 
award.140 Idaho at 457, 95 P.3d at 75 (emphasis added). 
As a general rule, a court cannot make a sua sponte award of attorney fees without 
declaring the statutory basis for that award as required in Bingham v. Montane Resource 
Associates, 133 Idaho 420, 424, 987 P.2d 1035, 1039 (1999), and written findings must be 
entered as cited above. "The question of a trial court's compliance with the rules of civil 
procedure relating to the recovery of attorney fees or costs is one of law upon which an appellate 
court exercises free review." JR. Simplot Co. v. Chemetics International, Inc., 130 Idaho 255, 
257, 939 P.2d 574, 576 (1997) (citing to Harney v. Weatherby, 116 Idaho 904, 906-07, 781 P.2d 
241, 243-44 (Ct. App.1989)). 
Due process applies to the award of costs and attorney fees. Nelson v. Adams USA, Inc., 
529 U.S. 460, 120 S.Ct. 1579, 146 L.Ed.2d 530 (2000), as cited in Haw v. Idaho State Board of 
Medicine, 140 Idaho 152, 159, 90 P.3d 902, 909 (2004). Due process protects both the right to 
object to, and to challenge the basis upon which an award of attorney's fees is made, in addition 
to the amount of that award. Bingham v. Montane Resource Associates, 133 Idaho 420,424,987 
P.2d 1035, 1039 (1999). 
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When an award of attorney fees is made under LC. § 12-121, which is believed to be the 
District Court's intention here (as also perceived by the Defendants), the court is required by 
I.R.C.P. 54(e)(2) to make a "written" finding. either in the award itself or in a separate 
document, that states the basis and reasons for the court's award under that statute. Neither 
the August 28, 2014 "Judgment" for Attorney Fees and Costs, nor the April 4, 2014 "Judgment 
Dismissing Case", nor any separate document, has ever been entered or filed to provide a 
"written finding" as to the basis and reasons for awarding § 12-121 attorney fees that satisfies the 
requirement of LR.C.P. 54(e)(2). The Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure are interpreted by use of 
the same rules of statutory construction which provide that meaning should be given to every 
word, clause, and sentence that is contained within any rule. Obendorf v. Terra Hug Spray Co., 
Inc., 145 Idaho 892, 900, 188 P.3d 834, 842 (2008). The requirement set out in Rule 54(e)(2) 
that the court is to make a separate "written" finding must be contained in a document for 
review. Those written findings, once made and entered in a case, must then be supported by the 
record as upholding the court's determination that the entire action was pursued 
frivolously. Wait v. Leavell Cattle, Inc., 136 Idaho 792, 799, 41 P.3d 220, 227 (2001). No such 
written finding was ever made in this case, and even the perception to that effect, as announced 
by the Defendants in their proposed "Judgment", were stricken by the Court in the prepared 
"judgment" presented to it for execution. 
In Ross v. Ross, 142 Idaho 536, 129 P.3d 1285 (Ct.App.2006), the Idaho Court of 
Appeals emphatically declared the applicable standard for an award of attorney fees under LC. 
§ 12-121: [W]hen deciding whether the case was brought or defended frivolously, unreasonably, 
or without foundation, the entire course of the litigation must be taken into accnunt. Vendelin 
v. Costco Wholesale Corp., 140 Idaho 416, 434, 95 P.3d 34, 52 (2004); McGrew, 139 Idaho at 
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562, 82 P.3d at 844. (Emphasis added). If there is a legitimate, triable issue of fact, attorney 
fees may not be awarded under I. C. § 12-121 even though the losing party has asserted factual or 
legal claims that are frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation. Vendelin, 140 Idaho at 434, 
95 P.3d at 52; Nampa & Meridian Irr. Dist., 135 Idaho at 524-25, 20 P.3d at 708-09. 142 Idaho 
at 539, 129 P.3d at 1288 (emphasis added). In other words, if there is at least one legitimate 
issue that was presented in the case, then attorney fees cannot be awarded under I. C. § 12-121 
even though the losing party may have asserted other factual or legal claims that are allegedly 
frivolous, unreasonable, or without adequate legal or factual foundation. McGrew v. McGrew, 
139 Idaho 551,562, 82 P.3d 833,844 (2003). 
II. 
ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
1. Did the District Court err and abuse its discretion in awarding attorney fees and costs to the 




The District Court erred and abused its discretion in awarding attorney fees and costs to 
the defendants, whether under a prevailing party theory or under §12-121. 
As stated above in the Standard of Review section, when a Court awards attorney fees under 
§ 12-121, Idaho Code, it must first enter written findings to support its decision for any such award. 
A reporters is not a substitute for the entry of written findings in the record, as the discussion 
between the court and counsel, during argument presented on the motions, cannot constitute an 
analysis under that statutory provisions for attorney fees, as it is insufficient to support the record , 
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as it must be contained in written findings filed of record in the case, before any entry of such an 
award fees to be ordered in the judgment that was later entered by the Court on August 28, 2014. 
There has been no memorandum filed by the Court to identify any of its decisions entered by the 
Court in this case on any of the motion(s) filed and argued by the parties, so there is no analysis, 
findings, or factual basis contained in a Clerk's Record to address the reasoning of the Court, either 
with respect to the dismissal of the case, or the award of such fees and costs to the Defendants. 
Furthermore, any misperception of law or of one's interest under the law is not, by itself, 
unreasonable conduct. If it were, virtually every case controlled by a question of law would entail 
an attorney fee award against the losing party under I. C. § 12-121. The issue of a real party in 
interest had become raised, and Rule 17(a) addresses how that is to be resolved. The District Court 
failed to apply the Rule correctly, and furthermore, violated the Rule, as the Court dismissed the 
case when specifically precluded from doing so, without first giving reasonable opportunity to 
substitute in a real party in interest, of which several alternatives were available for consideration,, 
including the individual who came to hold and control all interests of a proper Party Plaintiff, either 
individually, who held an interest also in the beans, or as a personal representative in an estate to be 
opened, or as a member of the LLC that came to hold interests as well by the transfers made in 
2012. A proper substitution could have, and would have been made, if allowed, and that factor does 
not constitute a basis for entry of a fee award as a consequence of seeking the proper substitution 
under the Rules. 
Additionally, as stated above, the entire course of the litigation must be taken into 
account. See Vendelin v. Costco rVholesale Corp., 140 Idaho 416, 434, 95 P.3d 34, 52 (2004); 
McGrew, 139 Idaho at 562, 82 P.3d at 844. (emphasis added). If there is a legitimate, triable 
issue of fact, then attorney fees may not be awarded under §12-121, Idaho Code, even though 
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the losing party has asserted factual or legal claims that may be or m fact are frivolous, 
unreasonable, or without foundation. Again see Vendelin, 140 Idaho at 434, 95 P.3d at 52; 
Nampa & 1\1eridian Irr. Dist., 135 Idaho at 524-25, 20 P.3d at 708-09. 142 Idaho at 539, 129 
P.3d at 1288 ( emphasis added). If there is one legitimate issue that was presented in the case, 
then attorney fees cannot be awarded under §12-121, Idaho Code, even though the losing party 
may have asserted other factual or legal claims that are allegedly frivolous, unreasonable, or 
without adequate legal or factual foundation. See McGrew v. McGrew, 139 Idaho 551, 562, 82 
P.3d 833, 844 (2003). Those required written findings don't exist in our case, and if they did, 
they would be a reflection of an abuse of discretion and violation of the Rules of Procedure on 
the subject of real party(s) in interest. When such written findings are made, they must in tum be 
supported by the record as upholding the court's determination that the entire action was 
pursued frivolously. Wait v. Leavell Cattle, Inc., 136 Idaho 792, 799, 41 P.3d 220, 227 
(2001). Not only were no such written findings ever made in this case, but the action was not 
even allowed to be pursued by the real party or parties in interest, as the Court truncated the 
intent of the Procedural Rules that allow substitution and joinder, and specifically prohibit and 
decision to dismiss the action, without affording the reasonable and necessary opportunity to 
determine the proper means and method of substitution. The Defendants' counsel, who drafted 
the "Judgment" to be entered on attorney fees and costs, believed the Court's basis for such an 
award was under §12-121, Idaho Code, but even that passing reference was stricken by the 
Court in the prepared "judgment" presented to the Court by the Defendants for execution. 
III. 
CONCLUSION 
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This case should be remanded to the District Court, with instructions to vacate the 
judgment of August 28, 2014, awarding attorney fees and costs to the Defendants. To allow the 
judgment to stand serves only to add insult to the injury that Plaintiff is unable to redress a valid 
and meritorious claim against these Defendants, who refuse to return the beans they haven't paid 
for as required under the agreement, and seek to appropriate the beans by taking advantage of the 
death of Victoria H. Smith and the passage of time. 
Respectfully submitted this 22nd day of December, 2015. 
Vernon K. Smith 
Attorney for Plaintiff(s)-Appellant(s) 
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